Ética da crença: é errado crer sem evidências suficientes?

Abstract

This study examines the Ethics of Belief in light of the positions of William K. Clifford and William James. The research begins with Clifford’s classical formulation of evidentialism, which asserts that it is always wrong to believe without sufficient evidence, contrasting it with William James’s pragmatist approach, which allows for the permissibility of beliefs without evidential support in certain contexts. The study analyzes the possibility of voluntary control, the idea of sufficiency of evidence, and exceptions to evidentialism, engaging with authors such as Richard Feldman, Eros Carvalho, and Rima Basu. Additionally, this dissertation investigates the distinction between different types of belief and their relevance for the formulation of norms for belief, considering both pragmatic and moral encroachment in the debate. The objective is to assess the extent to which the evidentialist conception of the Ethics of Belief withstands pragmatist critiques, proposing a normative model that better explains the relationship between belief, evidence, and moral and practical reasons.