Discussão sobre a metodologia de distribuição dos royalties recebidos pelos municípios afetados pela construção de usinas hidrelétricas: o caso da UHE Itapebi

Abstract

This paper aims to propose a methodology for the distribution of royalties received by the municipalities affected by the construction of a hydroelectric power station (HPS). The methodology consists of the allocation rule of the Shapley value, which belongs to the cooperative game theory, and to demonstrate its applicability was performed a case study on HPS Itapebi. The current distribution of royalties basically takes into account the criterion of flooded area by the reservoir, however, many negative impacts (environmental, social, etc.) arise from the construction of dams and since they are not adequately compensated was proposed to include the criterion of externalities. In the application of the methodology, different scenarios were constructed by setting weights for the two criteria. When it gave greater weight to the criterion of the flooded area, the municipality of Itabepi, the one with more area inundated by water, received the largest amount of royalty. When it was given greater weight to the criterion of externalities, the municipality of Salto da Divisa received the largest amount of royalty, since it was who suffered the most negative impacts and had more conflicts with HPS. The results indicate that the use of only the flooded area can be a very strict criterion for the distribution of royalties. Other criteria, such as externalities, may be included and for this, the Shapley value is an effective proposal.