Fenomenologia transcendental e naturalismo na fundamentação epistemológica do enativismo

Abstract

An investigation into the epistemological foundations of enactivism reveals, beyond mere phenomenological inspiration, different positions regarding the continuity and delimitation between transcendental phenomenology and the empirical sciences. On the one hand, we have the thesis of fundamental circularity, attributed to the first enactivists, according to which enactivism consists of a properly scientific continuation of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology; on the other hand, authored by contemporary enactivists, the thesis of mutual clarification, which aims to preserve the delimitation between the disciplines and establish a relationship of reciprocal collaboration. Both theses, however, subscribe to naturalism, and yet aim to accommodate the transcendental pretensions of phenomenology within their scope. In view of this, we set out to clarify this scenario by returning to the work of two phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Starting with the reconstruction of the main theses of Philosophy as a Rigorous Science and Ideas I, we demarcate Husserl's most clearly anti-naturalistic thesis, as well as his idea of transcendental phenomenology. We then turn to Ideas III to elucidate the relationship between phenomenology and the natural sciences and psychology. Finally, we turned to the Phenomenology of Perception to understand Merleau-Ponty's use of empirical data and his modification of transcendental phenomenology. We conclude that, faced with the more traditional theses of phenomenology represented in the first two works investigated, enactivism can only be considered an unsustainable scientific project. However, when we consider Husserl's textual guidelines on the use of empirical data in phenomenology, and the very appropriation of empirical data in Merleau-Ponty's work, we find justification for the thesis of mutual enlightenment. Questions remain nevertheless about the definition of the idea of nature and indications for a renewal of the discussion about naturalism.