A clareza do discurso: uma resposta naturalista para o problema da obscuridade do texto filosófico

Abstract

This dissertation parts from the problem of the unintelligibility of philosophical discourse. The focus resides in the comparison between two contrasting interpretations of the same problem, and, therefore, between two proposals which suggest different solutions. The contrast is between the philosophy of language present in John Dewey’s work, and the philosophy of language inaugurated by the works of Gottlob Frege. From Dewey we receive an account based on a theory of meaning, and, as a solution, the method of historical contextualization. Frege, in turn, formulates the problem based on a theory of reference, and suggests as a solution the method of language analysis. The two authors represent distinct philosophical projects. The main goal is the comparative exam of the most antagonic metatheoric points between the two projects, and the respective theories of language, meaning and reference. The hypothesis is that a thorough analysis of these different interpretations is indispensable in order to comprehend the problem, and, over all, to guide us to a feasible solution nowadays. The present work has, therefore, the intention of humbly contribute to the transformation of philosophical writing, by means of a familiarization with the most relevant philosophical debates on the theme, and by postulating clarity as one of the regulating principles of philosophy.