Dispersão acionária e remuneração dos administradores

Abstract

Companies with more dispersed ownership tend to pay their executives more due to problems of collective action and agency costs. This article analyzes the relationship between the dispersion of ownership and the compensation of executives and directors. Detailed information on the remuneration of the managerial team and the board became available from 2010, allowing this analysis to contribute to the understanding this relationship. The models estimated from a sample of 315 Brazilian companies traded on stock exchanges indicate a positive economic and statistically significant correlation between executive compensation and ownership dispersion. Ceteris paribus, companies with more dispersed share ownership pay higher remuneration to its top executives. Likewise, family controlled companies pay more to their chief executive, but not to the managerial team as a whole, and the remuneration of directors increases in line with a greater number of control group members or their relatives on the board. There was support, thus, for the Managerial Power Hypothesis in companies more dispersed ownership and for the extraction of private benefits in companies with concentrated control.